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In 1976, 2 recruits at Fort Dix, New Jersey, had an
influenzalike illness. Isolates of virus taken from them
included A/New Jersey/76 (Hsw1n1), a strain similar to the
virus believed at the time to be the cause of the 1918 pan-
demic, commonly known as swine flu. Serologic studies at
Fort Dix suggested that >200 soldiers had been infected
and that person-to-person transmission had occurred. We
review the process by which these events led to the public
health decision to mass-vaccinate the American public
against the virus and the subsequent events that led to the
program’s cancellation. Observations of policy and imple-
mentation success and failures are presented that could
help guide decisions regarding avian influenza.
“Flu to the Starboard! Man the Harpoons! 
Fill with Vaccine! Get the Captain! Hurry!”
Edwin D. Kilbourne, New York Times, February 13, 1976 (1) 
“Grounding a Pandemic”
Barack Obama and Richard Lugar, 
New York Times, June 6, 2005 (2)
“It has been 37 years since the last influenza pandemic,
or widespread global epidemic, so by historic patterns we
may be due for another.”
New York Times, July 17, 2005 (3)
K
ilbourne in 1976 (1) noted that pandemics of influen-
za occur every 11 years. Since the latest prediction in
the New York Times (3) suggests that after 39 years we
may be overdue for a pandemic, and since 2 US senators
have recently headlined the possibility (2), that observa-
tion may become a political fact. Whether it becomes a sci-
entific fact and a policy fact is yet to be seen. Some
reflections on 1976 from 2 insiders’ viewpoints may iden-
tify some of the pitfalls that public health policymakers
will face in addressing potential influenza pandemics.
Swine Flu at Fort Dix
On February 3, 1976, the New Jersey State Health
Department sent the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in
Atlanta isolates of virus from recruits at Fort Dix, New
Jersey, who had influenzalike illnesses. Most of the iso-
lates were identified as A/Victoria/75 (H3N2), the contem-
porary epidemic strain. Two of the isolates, however, were
not typeable in that laboratory. On February 10, additional
isolates were sent and identified in CDC laboratories as
A/New Jersey/76 (Hsw1N1), similar to the virus of the
1918 pandemic and better known as “swine flu.”
A meeting of representatives of the military, the
National Institute of Health, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and the State of New Jersey
Department of Health was quickly convened on Saturday,
February 14, 1976. Plans of action included heightened
surveillance in and around Fort Dix, investigation of the ill
recruits to determine if contact with pigs had occurred, and
serologic testing of recruits to determine if spread had
occurred at Fort Dix. 
Surveillance activities at Fort Dix gave no indication
that recruits had contact with pigs. Surveillance in the sur-
rounding communities found influenza caused by the cur-
rent strain of influenza, A/Victoria, but no additional cases
of swine flu. Serologic testing at Fort Dix indicated that
person-to-person transmission had occurred in >200
recruits (4). 
In 1974 and 1975, 2 instances of humans infected with
swine influenza viruses had been documented in the
United States. Both persons involved had close contact
with pigs, and no evidence for spread of the virus beyond
family members with pig contact could be found (5). 
The National Influenza Immunization Program
On March 10, 1976, the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices of the United States Public Health
Service (ACIP) reviewed the findings. The committee con-
cluded that with a new strain (the H1N1 New Jersey strain)
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ic was a possibility. Specifically, the following facts were
of concern: 1) persons <50 years of age had no antibodies
to this new strain; 2) a current interpandemic strain
(A/Victoria) of influenza was widely circulating; 3) this
early detection of an outbreak caused by A/New
Jersey/76/Hsw1N1 (H1N1) provided an opportunity to
produce a vaccine since there was sufficient time between
the initial isolates and the advent of an expected influenza
season to produce vaccine. In the past when a new pan-
demic strain had been identified, there had not been
enough time to manufacture vaccine on any large scale; 4)
influenza vaccines had been used for years with demon-
strated safety and efficacy when the currently circulating
vaccine strain was incorporated; 5) the military vaccine
formulation for years had included H1N1, an indication
that production was possible, and no documented adverse
effects had been described.
ACIP recommended that an immunization program be
launched to prevent the effects of a possible pandemic.
One ACIP member summarized the consensus by stating
“If we believe in prevention, we have no alternative but to
offer and urge the immunization of the population.” One
ACIP member expressed the view that the vaccine should
be stockpiled, not given.
Making this decision carried an unusual urgency. The
pharmaceutical industry had just finished manufacture of
the vaccine to be used in the 1976–1977 influenza season.
At that time, influenza vaccine was produced in fertilized
hen’s eggs from special flocks of hens. Roosters used for
fertilizing the hens were still available; if they were
slaughtered, as was customary, the industry could not
resume production for several months. 
On March 13, an action memo was presented to the
Secretary of the Department of Health Education and
Welfare (DHEW). It outlined the problem and presented 4
alternative courses of action. First was “business as usual,”
with the marketplace prevailing and the assumption that a
pandemic might not occur. The second was a recommen-
dation that the federal government embark on a major pro-
gram to immunize a highly susceptible population. As a
reason to adopt this plan of action, the memo stated that
“the Administration can tolerate unnecessary health expen-
ditures better than unnecessary death and illness if a pan-
demic should occur.” The third proposed course of action
was a minimal response, in which the federal government
would contract for sufficient vaccine to provide for tradi-
tional federal beneficiaries—military personnel, Native
Americans, and Medicare-eligible persons. The fourth
alternative was a program that would represent an exclu-
sively federal response without involvement of the states.
The proposal recommended by the director of CDC was
the second course, namely, for the federal government to
contract with private pharmaceutical companies to pro-
duce sufficient vaccine to permit the entire population to
be immunized against H1N1. The federal government
would make grants to state health departments to organize
and conduct immunization programs. The federal govern-
ment would provide vaccine to state health departments
and private medical practices. Since influenza caused by
A/Victoria was active worldwide, industry was asked to
incorporate the swine flu into an A/Victoria product to be
used for populations at high risk. 
Before the discussions with the secretary of DHEW had
been completed, a member of his staff sent a memo to a
health policy advisor in the White House, raising the
specter of the 1918 pandemic, which had been specifically
underemphasized in the CDC presentation. CDC’s presen-
tation highlighted the pandemic potential, comparing it
with the 1968–69 Hong Kong and 1957–58 Asian pan-
demics. President Gerald Ford’s staff recommended that
the president convene a large group of well-known and
respected scientists (Albert Sabin and Jonas Salk had to be
included) and public representatives to hear the govern-
ment’s proposal and make recommendations to the presi-
dent about it. After the meeting, the president had a press
conference, highlighted by the unique simultaneous
appearance of Salk and Sabin. President Ford announced
that he accepted the recommendations that CDC had orig-
inally made to the secretary of DHEW. The National
Influenza Immunization Program (NIIP) was initiated.
The proposal was presented to 4 committees of the
Congress, House and Senate authorization committees and
House and Senate appropriation committees. All 4 com-
mittees reported out favorable legislation, and an appropri-
ation bill was passed and signed.
The estimated budgeted cost of the program was $137
million. When Congress passed the appropriation, newspa-
pers mischaracterized the cost as “$1.9 billion” because
the $137 million was included as part of a $1.9 billion sup-
plemental appropriation for the Department of Labor. In
the minds of the public, this misconception prevailed.
Immediately after the congressional hearing, a meeting
of all directors of state health departments and medical
societies was held at CDC. The program was presented by
CDC, and attendees were asked for comments. Arepresen-
tative from the New Jersey state health department
opposed the plan; the Wisconsin state medical society
opposed any federal involvement. Otherwise, state and
local health departments approved the plan. 
Within CDC, a unit charged with implementing the pro-
gram, which reported to the director, was established. This
unit, NIIP, had complete authority to draw upon any
resources at CDC needed. NIIP was responsible for rela-
tions with state and local health departments (including
administration of the grant program for state operations,
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warehousing and distribution of the vaccine to state health
departments) and established a proactive system of sur-
veillance for possible adverse effects of the influenza vac-
cines, the NIIP Surveillance Assessment Center
(NIIP-SAC). (This innovative surveillance system would
prove to be NIIP’s Trojan horse.) In spite of the obstacles
discussed below, NIIP administered a program that immu-
nized 45 million in 10 weeks, which resulted in doubling
the level of immunization for persons deemed to be at high
risk, rapidly identifying adverse effects, and developing
and administering an informed consent form for use in a
community-based program.  
Obstacles to the Vaccination Plan
The principal obstacle was the lack of vaccines. As test
batches were prepared, the largest ever field trials of
influenza vaccines ensued. The vaccines appeared effica-
cious and safe (although in the initial trials, children did
not respond immunologically to a single dose of vaccine,
and a second trial with a revised schedule was needed) (6).
Hopes were heightened for a late summer/early fall kick-
off of mass immunization operations. 
In January 1976, before the New Jersey outbreak, CDC
had proposed legislation that would have compensated
persons damaged as a result of immunization when it was
licensed by FDA and administered in the manner recom-
mended by ACIP. The rationale given was that immuniza-
tion protects the community as well as the individual (a
societal benefit) and that when a person participating in
that societal benefit is damaged, society had a responsibil-
ity to that person. The proposal was sent back from a staff
member in the Surgeon General’s office with a handwrit-
ten note, “This is not a problem.”
Soon, however, NIIP received the first of 2 crippling
blows to hopes to immunize “every man, woman, and
child.” The first was later in 1976, when instead of boxes
of bottled vaccine, the vaccine manufacturers delivered an
ultimatum—that the federal government indemnify them
against claims of adverse reactions as a requirement for
release of the vaccines. The government quickly capitulat-
ed to industry’s demand for indemnification. While the
manufacturers’ ultimatum reflected the trend of increased
litigiousness in American society, its unintended, unmis-
takable subliminal message blared “There’s something
wrong with this vaccine.” This public misperception, war-
ranted or not, ensured that every coincidental health event
that occurred in the wake of the swine flu shot would be
scrutinized and attributed to the vaccine.
On August 2, 1976, deaths apparently due to an influen-
zalike illness were reported from Pennsylvania in older
men who had attended the convention of the American
Legion in Philadelphia. A combined team of CDC and
state and local health workers immediately investigated.
By the next day, epidemiologic evidence indicated that the
disease was not influenza (no secondary cases occurred in
the households of the patients). By August 4, laboratory
evidence conclusively ruled out influenza. However, this
series of events was interpreted by the media and others as
an attempt by the government to “stimulate” NIIP.  
Shortly after the national campaign began, 3 elderly
persons died after receiving the vaccine in the same clinic.
Although investigations found no evidence that the vac-
cine and deaths were causally related, press frenzy was so
intense it drew a televised rebuke from Walter Cronkite for
sensationalizing coincidental happenings.
Guillain-Barré Syndrome
What NIIP did not and could not survive, however, was
the second blow, finding cases of Guillain-Barré syndrome
(GBS) among persons receiving swine flu immunizations.
As of 1976, >50 “antecedent events” had been identified in
temporal relationship to GBS, events that were considered
as possible factors in its cause. The list included viral
infections, injections, and “being struck by lightning.”
Whether or not any of the antecedents had a causal rela-
tionship to GBS was, and remains, unclear. When cases of
GBS were identified among recipients of the swine flu
vaccines, they were, of course, well covered by the press.
Because GBS cases are always present in the population,
the necessary public health questions concerning the cases
among vaccine recipients were “Is the number of cases of
GBS among vaccine recipients higher than would be
expected? And if so, are the increased cases the result of
increased surveillance or a true increase?” Leading epi-
demiologists debated these points, but the consensus,
based on the intensified surveillance for GBS (and other
conditions) in recipients of the vaccines, was that the num-
ber of cases of GBS appeared to be an excess.
Had H1N1 influenza been transmitted at that time, the
small apparent risk of GBS from immunization would
have been eclipsed by the obvious immediate benefit of
vaccine-induced protection against swine flu. However, in
December 1976, with >40 million persons immunized and
no evidence of H1N1 transmission, federal health officials
decided that the possibility of an association of GBS with
the vaccine, however small, necessitated stopping immu-
nization, at least until the issue could be explored. Amora-
torium on the use of the influenza vaccines was announced
on December 16; it effectively ended NIIP of 1976. Four
days later the New York Times published an op-ed article
that began by asserting, “Misunderstandings and miscon-
ceptions... have marked Government ... during the last
eight years,” attributing NIIP and its consequences to
“political expediency” and “the self interest of government
health bureaucracy” (7). These simple and sinister
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to describe the program, “debacle” in the text and “Swine
Flu Fiasco” in the title. 
On February 7, the new secretary of DHEW, Joseph A.
Califano, announced the resumption of immunization of
high-risk populations with monovalent A/Victoria vaccine
that had been prepared as part of the federal contracts, and
he dismissed the director of CDC.
Lessons Learned
NIIP may offer lessons for today’s policymakers, who
are faced with a potential pandemic of avian influenza and
struggling with decisions about preventing it (Figure). Two
of these lessons bear further scrutiny here.
Media and Presidential Attention
While all decisions related to NIIP had been reached in
public sessions (publishing of the initial virus findings in
CDC’s weekly newsletter, the Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report (MMWR); New York Times reporter
Harold Schmeck’s coverage of the ACIPsessions, the pres-
ident’s press conference, and 4 congressional hearings),
effective communication from scientifically qualified per-
sons was lacking, and the perception prevailed that the
program was motivated by politics rather than science. In
retrospect (and to some observers at the time), the presi-
dent’s highly visible convened meeting and subsequent
press conference, which included pictures of his being
immunized, were mistakes. These instances seemed to
underline the suspicion that the program was politically
motivated, rather than a public health response to a possi-
ble catastrophe. 
Annex 11 of the draft DHEW pandemic preparedness
plan states, “For policy decisions and in communication,
making clear what is not known is as important as stating
what is known. When assumptions are made, the basis for
the assumptions and the uncertainties surrounding them
should be communicated” (11). This goal is much better
accomplished if the explanations are communicated by
those closest to the problem, who can give authoritative
scientific information. Scientific information coming from
a nonscientific political figure is likely to encourage skep-
ticism, not enthusiasm.
Neither CDC nor the health agencies of the federal gov-
ernment had been in the habit of holding regular press con-
ferences. CDC considered that its appropriate main line of
communication was to states and local health departments,
believing that they were best placed to communicate with
the public. MMWR served both a professional and public
audience and accounted for much of CDC’s press cover-
age. In 1976, no all-news stations existed, only the nightly
news. The decision to stop the NIIP on December 16,
1976, was announced by a press release from the office of
the assistant secretary for health. The decision to reinsti-
tute the immunization of those at high risk was announced
by a press release from the office of the secretary, DHEW.
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1. Expect the unexpected: it will always happen. 
Some examples:
• Children did not respond to the initial formulation of vac-
cine.
• Liability for untoward events after immunization became
a major issue.
• Deaths occurred in Pittsburgh that were coincidental with
but unrelated to the vaccines (8).
• Cases of a new and unrelated disease, Legionnaires dis-
ease, appeared (9).
• "Excess" cases of Guillain-Barré syndrome appeared
among recipients of vaccines (10).
• Erroneous laboratory reports of viral isolates or serologic
conversions occurred in Washington, DC, Boston,
Virginia, and Taiwan.
• The pandemic failed to appear.
2. Surveillance for influenza disease worked well. This was
plain, "old-fashioned" surveillance without computers. A new
strain of influenza was identified within weeks of the first rec-
ognized outbreak of illness.
3. Interagency cooperation works without formal agree-
ments. The state health departments, military, National
Institutes of Health, US Food and Drug Administration, and
Center for Disease Control all worked together in a coopera-
tive and mutually beneficial manner.
4. Surveillance for untoward events demonstrated that
only when large numbers of people are exposed to a vaccine
or drug are adverse reactions identified (Guillain-Barré syn-
drome with influenza vaccines; paralysis with the Cutter
poliovirus vaccine in 1955).
5. Health legislation can and should be developed on the
basis of the epidemiologic picture.
6. Media and public awareness can be a major obstacle
to implementing a large, innovative program responding to
risks that are difficult, if not impossible, to quantitate.
• Creating a program as a presidential initiative makes
modifying or stopping the program more difficult. 
• Explanations should be communicated by those who can
give authoritative scientific information. 
• Periodic press briefings work better than responding to
press queries.
7. The advisability of the decision to begin immunization
on the strength of the Fort Dix episode is worthy of serious
question and debate (see text). 
8. The risk of potentially unnecessary costs in a mass
vaccination campaign is minimal. (The direct cost of the
1976 program was $137 million. In today's dollars, this is
<$500 million.) The potential cost of a pandemic is ines-
timable but astronomical. 
Figure. Lessons learned from the 1976 National Influenza
Immunization Program (NIIP).Reflections on Swine Flu Vaccination Program
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In retrospect, periodic press briefings would have served
better than responding to press queries. The public must
understand that decisions are based on public health, not
politics. To this end, health communication should be
by health personnel through a regular schedule of media
briefings.
Decision To Begin Immunization
This decision is worthy of serious question and debate.
As Walter Dowdle (12) points out in this issue of Emerging
Infectious Diseases, the prevailing wisdom was that a pan-
demic could be expected at any time. Public health offi-
cials were concerned that if immunization was delayed
until H1N1 was documented to have spread to other
groups, the disease would spread faster than any ability to
mobilize preventive vaccination efforts. Three cases of
swine influenza had recently occurred in persons who had
contact with pigs. In 1918, after the initial outbreak of
influenza at Fort Riley in April, widespread outbreaks of
influenza did not occur until late summer (13). 
The Delphi exercise of Schoenbaum in early fall of
1976 (13) was the most serious scientific undertaking to
poll scientists to decide whether or not to continue the pro-
gram. Its main finding was that the cost benefit would be
best if immunization were limited to those >25 years of
age (and now young children are believed to be a potent
source of spread of influenza virus!). Unfortunately, no
biblical Joseph was there to rise from prison and interpret
the future.
As Dowdle further states (12), risk assessment and risk
management are separate functions. But they must come
together with policymakers, who must understand both.
These discussions should not take place in large groups in
the president’s cabinet room but in an environment that can
establish an educated understanding of the situation. Once
the policy decisions are made, implementation should be
left to a single designated agency. Advisory groups should
be small but representative. CDC had the lead responsibil-
ity for operation of the program. Implementation by com-
mittee does not work. Within CDC, a unit was established
for program execution, including surveillance, outbreak
investigation, vaccine procurement and distribution,
assignment of personnel to states, and awarding and mon-
itoring grants to the states. Communications up the chain
of command to the policymakers and laterally to other
directly involved federal agencies were the responsibility
of the CDC director, not the director of NIIP, who was
responsible for communications to the states and local
health departments, those ultimately implementing opera-
tions of the program. This organizational mode functioned
well, a tribute to the lack of interagency jealousies.
Decision-making Risks
When lives are at stake, it is better to err on the side of
overreaction than underreaction. Because of the unpre-
dictability of influenza, responsible public health leaders
must be willing to take risks on behalf of the public. This
requires personal courage and a reasonable level of under-
standing by the politicians to whom these public health
leaders are accountable. All policy decisions entail risks
and benefits: risks or benefits to the decision maker; risks
or benefits to those affected by the decision. In 1976, the
federal government wisely opted to put protection of the
public first. 
Dr Sencer was director of CDC from 1966 to 1977. 
Dr Millar was director of NIIP in 1976.
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